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Kavolis: Social Movements and Civilizational Processes

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND CIVILIZATIONAL PROCESSES
Vytautas Kavolis
Social movements are usually thought of as collective enterprises,
partly organized but to a larger extent spontaneous, seeking to promote
or to resist a particular kind of change in the organization of society, in
some basic elements or the whole design of a cultural tradition and, one
should by now add, in collective and personal identities and sensibilities.* The major social movements, which have had the strongest impact on their societies and whole civilizations, pose special problems to
the sociological study of movements and have tended in fact to be neglected in recent sociology.
They are apt to be internally inconsistent, with contradictory ideologies and sensibilities struggling for primacy within their overall thrust.
They operate as movements-within-movements, more or less clearly
identifiable groupings rising up, splitting or merging with others and
then, in many cases, disappearing, only to revive, in some instances,
under a new name, and with a different face, many years later, in distant
lands. Whole movements emerge into dramatic visibility at times and
lead a subterranean existence, as no more than a set of memories and a
tracing of sensibilities, at other times. Their boundaries are not clear,
people joining and taking their leaves, participating either passionately
or calculatingly or merely giving support from the sidelines and sympathizing from a distance, ideas moving across all the dividing lines
within the immense terrain which is the sphere of action, actual or imagined, of major social movements.
I. Social Movements and Modernization
A review, from the civilization-analytic point of view, of recent studies of social movements reveals two inadequacies in the current sociological mode of comprehending them. The first is a lacking in-depth
attentiveness to the symbolic configurations activated by particular
movements and to the interactions of these historically specific symbolic designs with the perhaps more general social processes of movement emergence and submergence. The dominant approach in the theory of social movements is concerned with the constraints and facilities
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affecting the likelihood of occurrence of certain types of human
actions.' Much less, if any, attention is given to the historical construction of the deeper reasons for acting—the fundamental and subtle cultural processes which social movements not only presuppose, but in
which they, to a greater or lesser degree, participate.
The second inadequacy in the sociological theory of social movements derives from the premise of disconnectedness to which much of
sociological work, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, is subject.
Each movement is theoretically comprehended as a processual entity
delimited by boundaries almost as tangible as those which separate one
organism from another and detached from long-term processes through
which the civilization in which it occurs has acquired or is changing its
fundamental character. A disconnecting attitude allows us to see particular phenomena more clearly in their distinctiveness, but it desensitizes
us to the question of the deeper groundings of the particular phenomena.
The main theoretical exception to the disconnecting tendency in the
study of social movements, especially liberal, revolutionary and nationalist, consists of efforts to link social movements to modernization.2 But
this has been only a moderately fruitful approach—partly because it has
not been systematically done over the whole range of movements, but
mainly, it would seem, because of a constricted conception of modernization.
The theory (if theory it is) of modernization has suffered, until recently, from a conceptualization both uniformitarian and totalistic. The
dominant premise has been that modernization has a preordained fundamental direction, derived from the West European "rationalizing"
eighteenth-nineteenth century paradigm of modernization, different
parts of the world being positioned favorably or unfavorably in relation
to it. In the grip of this universal process of modernization, all parts of
each socio-cultural entity, moved by the same advancing spirit, have
been expected to change in a manner comprehensible by postulating the
universal process.
The universal process itself has been conceived of onesidedly. The
main thrust of modernization has been viewed as organizational and
attitudinal "rationalization" (and claims to universal participation and
accountability of elites). Such phenomena as the formation of emotional
and spiritual energies ("mysticism," "romanticism," "spiritual reawakenings") and releases and dissipations of impulsivity which typically precede, occur simultaneously with, or follow upon advances in
structural rationalization, have, with a few exceptions, not been incor-
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porated into the systematic theorizing on modernization or considered
of primary interest to it.3 (Or the complex cultural processes behind
these phenomena have been reduced to psychological measures of " m o tivation" or speculations about "generational revolt.")
To the extent that the concern with modernization has given rise to
causal-explanatory theories, modernization has been absorbed into the
general framework of the theory of (linear or "multilinear") societal
evolution. But perhaps modernization could also be understood as a
historical series of efforts at updating of civilizational designs through a
variety of interweaving, dialectical, and recurrent processes. Evolutionary theory is dominated by a drive-forward mechanism. Civilizational
dynamics one would assume to be attuned to or sensitized by intuitions
of fitness or adequacy of parts of a civilization to the persisting or
emerging totalities to which they belong (where fitness is, more frequently than not, a matter of balancing discordant elements).
Modernization in the civilizational sense—as distinguished from societal evolution—suggests (a) a great diversity of designs of modernization (explicit or inferrable programs of "updating," "improvement,"
or "breaking-through" to "more advanced" modes of understanding or
organization); and (b) a wide variety of processes of modernization
within the distinguishable spheres of life of particular civilizations. The
emergence of Buddhism with its universalistic ethics prior to Christianity, or the development, in the Japanese courtly culture, of aesthetic
sensibilities capable of perceiving unforgettably high value in the transitory feelings of individuals, can be regarded as processes of cultural
modernization. But they occurred within designs of modernization radically different from the European nineteenth-century model within
which currently dominant versions of "modernization theory" continue
to be built. We are more faithful to the experience of mankind as a
whole if we disaggregate the concept of modernization and conceive
instead of a multiplicity of modernizations extending far into the historical past; and if we do not assume that cultural and organizational modernizations proceed along parallel lines. The currently dominant model
of modernization is one, though peculiarly explosive, historical construction within this ongoing, still proliferating series, quite likely to
surprise us with as yet inconceivable "modernizations" (some of which
will probably present themselves as antimodernist movements).
To find attentiveness to the deeper symbolic designs activated and
reshaped by particular movements and a sense of their fit within longterm sociocultural processes, one has to turn from the sociological theory of movements to historical and cultural studies of the contexts in

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1982

3

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 8 [1982], No. 8, Art. 5

34

which particular movements have emerged. Much has been done in
tracing the continuities between millennarian and revolutionary movements (or, in Africa, between witchcraft and prophecy); 4 in uncovering
the details of transformation of basic civilizational metaphors, such as
those of liberation, enlightenment, revolution,5 and of key notions, such
as those of justice, welfare, knowledge and "the people"; 6 in investigating the cultural, as well as the political and economic, effects of the
Protestant Reformation or of the French Revolution (or of the more
purely intellectual movements, such as the romantic or the psychoanalytic); 7 in describing the complexities of intercivilizational encounters in
the diverse social and intellectual movements arising in non-Western
societies upon exposure to the West (and, to a lesser degree, in Western
societies upon exposure to China, India, Africa, and even the South
Seas). 8
But the theory of social movements has not gained as much from the
historical studies as one might expect. The historical studies of social
movements, while illuminating particular cases in particular respects,
have not given us a general analytical grip on the question of how identifiable social movements relate to the development of a civilization as a
whole. Nor should historians be expected to provide us with a system of
analytic handles on this issue.
I propose here to explore an approach to social movements which
takes their location in relation to a rich, but not unlimited, plurality of
systematically comprehended civilizational processes as its problematic.
II. On the Conceptualization of Civilizational Processes
A civilization is the largest unit of sociocultural analysis which has
both a symbolic configuration of its own, with a distinctive script, and
an identifiable history of close economic, political, or ritual interdependence of its parts (more than a record of parallel processes and unpredictable encounters).'
The symbolic configurations of civilizations

are distinguished by two

elements not shared with "non-civilizational phenomena" both within
and outside of them, including "primitive cultures": (1) a thrust toward
a coherent mastery—or comprehensive understanding—of the world
within and beyond the bounds of any particular organized society; (2) a
set of principles by which any empirical condition within the existing
society, any pattern of human behavior, including one's own " s e l f , "
must be critically judged. The simultaneous presence of this intellectual
thrust with this set of principles is what winds up the springs of action of
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any generally recognized civilization (as distinguished from the moving
mechanisms of an empire or a system of states with which a civilization
may coincide in space).
It is not helpful to conceive of civilization as referring primarily to a
stage of societal evolution and to think of the civilizational process,
with Darcy Ribeiro, as that mix of technological and political developments which advances socioeconomic evolution and in particular accounts for the big steps into its urban and then industrial stages.10 One is
not faithful to the spirit of the subject being studied if, in studying
civilizations (as contrasted, for example, to economic, political, or social systems), one puts the primary emphasis on the generalized stages
of societal evolution and not on the distinctiveness of particular symbolic configurations that have proved to be capable of persisting, with
modifications but without loss of continuity, over several evolutionary
stages and capable also of encompassing within their patterns a wide
range of societies on varying levels of societal evolution.
It is not much more helpful to conceive of "civilization" as equivalent to civility—as the refinement of manners and the internalization of
the inhibitions appropriate to polite society, and to view the civilizing
process, with Norbert Elias, as that process, in the singular, by which
refinement of manners is acquired by social classes seeking to surround
their privileged status, or their claims to privilege, with continuous
demonstrations of the distance of the " c o o k e d " from the "raw." 1 1 The
particularities of symbolic design which define each civilization as that
which it is do not reside in the general tendency toward refinement of
manners and repression of gross physicality in the pacified elites of
hierarchic societies, nor mainly in the specificities of the ideal standards
of good manners of particular civilizations.
If one conceives of a civilization as a symbolic design of the largest
empirically given scope that orients social action in a major region of
the world continuously over several centuries, then civilizational processes can be thought of, first, as the dynamics of emergence of the
distinctive configurations of particular civilizations'2 and, second, as
long-term shifts in the relative intensities and forms of relation of basic
orientational elements within a civilizational design. It is the latter—not
origins, but transformations of symbolic designs—that will be of concern here. Both of these types may be thought of as general civilizational processes. They encompass, but should nevertheless be distinguished from, the special civilizational processes by which a particular
ideological component of a civilization, such as the idea of "fair play,"
emerges and changes over time or moves in social space.
Perhapsbya BYU
normative
type of civilizational
Published
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changes in the obligatory guidelines for perception and action, can be
distinguished from a sensitizing type of civilizational process, that is
from what we reconstitute as the histories of particular sensibilities, of
"the development of the feeling for nature," or of the "nobility of
failure," the changes in "attitudes toward death," or toward " w i l d
men" or toward madness, imprisonment, and love, the oscillations of
religious "enthusiasm," the voyages of The Demon of Noontide—
ennui.13 Sensitizing processes can be viewed as currents ( " g h o s t s " )
swirling around (or within) the more definitive structures ("machines")
being reshaped in the normative processes, imaginative representations
of how it feels to be subjected to such normative structures, their
changes, breakdowns, conflicts—or to their absences or insufficient
presences (anomie).
I will be primarily concerned here with the normative type of civilizational processes—but not because of any assumption that the normative
is either more illuminating or has a civilizational-genetic priority over
the sensitizing. In periods of historical discontinuity, it may be the opposite,14 and it is a good guess that at present there are greater possibilities of discovery precisely in the study of the sensitizing processes and
of their influences on the normative ones. But there is little crosscivilizational work on sensitizing processes. It is not even clear whether
sensibilities, in their pure, ideologically uncontaminated condition, can
not only be evoked but also analyzed.
How much of a theoretical basis do we have for studying civilizational processes of the normative type? A sociologist raised in the tradition that extends from Max Weber to Benjamin Nelson immediately
hears a few designations ringing in his ears: rationalization, universalization, fraternalization—a veritable equivalent of "liberty, equality,
fraternity." Of these, rationalization has been most widely used in
social-science literature, and with the greatest diversity of meanings.
Even in Weber's own work, as Arnold Eisen has recently reminded us,
"rationality" might signify either consciousness of purpose or calculation of means or control or logical coherence or impersonal universality
or systematization (of anything, including magic and mystical contemplation), not to mention the crucial but difficult distinction between formal and substantive rationality.11
If one moves beyond Weber and asks how the thrust of what is meant
by rationalization might differ in the West, with its tradition of separating a calculating reason from an impetuous emotion, and in China, with
its history of integration of mind with heart; in Greece, where reason
consolidates structures, and in India, where reason dissolves structures;
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in rabbinical Judaism, where reason locks out incomprehensible mystery, and in medieval Christianity, where it opens up to mystery, and in
our own times when reason seems for many to have become the capacity for inconclusive understanding,—when one takes all of this into account, the notion of rationality becomes a foundation for the comparative study of the meanings, nuances, and semantic linkages of the
category " r e a s o n " (and consequently of the notion of the "reasonable
m a n " and of his responsibilities), but we are no longer allowed to speak
of the civilizational process, or processes, of rationalization in the singular.
While the concept of "rationalization" can perhaps be employed, in a
fairly unambiguous but narrowly conventionalized sense, in developmental economics, in civilizational studies it has become a term for a
not yet available inventory of meanings and of their semantic linkages,
and for a series of historical comparisons of the processes of formulation, refinement, application, and dissolution of these meanings and
linkages, with a big question mark on the issue of what justifies the
subsumption of all of them under the same category. And the same may
well be true of any one concept we have for analyzing civilizational
processes in comparative perspective.
The concept tends to be of Western derivation and to suggest that
what matters is that which matters in the West, and that differentiations
and connections must be comprehended in ways familiar to Western
thought. But perhaps when a'network of concepts pointing to different
dimensions of experience or probabilities of concern (each stated in
several culturally alternative ways), and allowing for different kinds of
connections between them, is stretched out and the whole of it employed simultaneously for grasping any object of sociocultural investigation, problems of cross-civilizational comparison can be handled
more adequately.
III. Axes of Differentiation in Civilizational Designs
I propose to conceive of civilizational processes as shifts along one of
several axes of differentiation that we might expect to find in the basic
symbolic configurations of any civilization and its major components.
The axes of differentiation in the symbolic designs of civilizations are
points at which choices (whether explicit or implicit) have to be made as
to the degree of emphasis to be placed on, and the kind of elaboration to
be given to, each of mutually opposed, but always imaginable alternatives of orientation of basic importance in any civilizational configura-
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tion. These ever-present axes of differentiation, which are all drawn
from existing literature, would seem to include the following, stated
here in the form of analytically sharpened dilemmas of tendency or
attitude, though in actual historical situations they do not necessarily
relate to each other as battling opposites, as they have tended to do in
classical western traditions and their more obvious derivatives (but not
in Confucianism or the Japanese folk psychology, where they may be
conceived of as perpetually cooperative or "consubstantial," continuous at all points).
Structurally one can distinguish orientations, and processually one
can discern shifts, whether intended or not, toward one or the other
polarity of the following set of guiding directions for social action, for
ontological comprehension, and for spontaneous perception: (1) Controlling (or ascetic, or substantializing, or exoteric, or formalizing, or
determining, or closing) vs. liberating (or mystical, or desubstantializing, or esoteric, or energizing, or indetermining, or opening);'4 (2) Internalizing (intrapsychic or "subjectivizing") vs. externalizing (recognizing or establishing of "objective realities" outside of the human
psyche); (3) Rationalizing (confident advancing of the individual or collective reason, however conceived, to grasp what is regarded, in a particular tradition, as important) vs. emotionalizing or sensualizing (trust
in the validity of personalized or impersonal feelings or sensations,
seeking to intensify them); (4) Connecting (or totalistic, or continuous,
or synthesizing, or integrating, or organic, or realistic) vs. disconnecting (or individualistic, or discontinuous, or analyzing, or differentiating, or mechanical, or nominalistic);15 (5) Hierarchizing vs. equalizing
(or centralizing vs. decentralizing); (6) Empiricizing (Sensate, thisworldly, quantifying, temporalizing, "carnal" or "organizational") vs.
transcendentalizing
(Ideational, other-worldly or acosmic, nontemporalizing, qualifying, "spiritual", including faith in secular messianisms of the kind that seek an "end to history"); (7) Naturalizing (or
sacral: acceptance of obligations and meanings as given in the structure
of the universe or spontaneously arising without conscious human
action to establish them) vs. artificializing or art-making (or secular:
assumption that obligations and meanings arise entirely from human
actions intended to establish them); (8) Universalizing (or uniformitarian, the same standards for all) vs. particularizing (or diversitarian); (9)
Expanding (in limitless space, energy activating) vs. stabilizing (in limited space, energy-refining, receptivity-enhancing, "homeostatic");
and (10) Archaizing (or primitivizing, origins- or roots-seeking) vs.
futurizing
(or eschatologizing, infinite-progressing, redemptionseeking).16
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The historical record indicates that these axes of differentiation or
dimensions of concern constitute issues, at some point (but especially in
times of "civilizational crisis"), in the history of any civilization,
sometimes of course under the impact of an encounter with an alien
tradition powerfully representing unfamiliar affirmations. Different
axes become especially salient (attention-attracting and anxietyprovoking) in different civilizations or parts thereof and the relative
degree of salience of a particular axis within a civilization changes over
time.
The empiricity-transcendentality axis has generally been of greater
salience in the West than in China, although the West may now be
moving in the Chinese direction. Indeed all the axes of differentiation
have been more salient in the historic West than in Confucian China, for
the simple reason that foundational Western traditions differentiate
more rigorously—a tendency suggesting a preference, on the cultural
level, for seeing more clearly over living well. (East European peasants
have, however, remained "Chinese" in comparison to their intellectuals.)
Within the generally lesser salience of axes of differentiation in historic China, the expanding-stabilizing axis seems to have been treated
more onesidedly than the controlling-liberating axis (with liberation,
however, pertaining not to social-political action, as so frequently in the
West, but to religious pursuits and friendship, which in the West tends
to be conceived as a confirming rather than liberating experience). The
naturalizing vs. artificializing dimension has been of more anxious concern to the Taoists than to the Confucians, who saw it adequately dealt
with by the assumption of a nature-culture continuity from which only a
f e w cultural products, such as written law, were exempt. The
universalizing-particularizing axis was especially important to the Mohists. The empiricizing-transcendentalizing axis became crucial only for
the Buddhists. Similar variations in the saliency of civilizational axes of
differentiation for particular cultural movements and the various social
classes are demonstrable for the West, and probably could be discerned
in any other civilization for which adequate records exist. A full description of the historical varieties and shifts in axes of differentiation
would go far toward a comparative dynamic analysis of the basic structures of particular civilizations.
I further presume a civilizational requirement that, in the normal
course of affairs, both sides of each axis of differentiation will, perhaps
not simultaneously but over a period of time, be sufficiently elaborated,
in theory or in practice, to provide for a degree of tension between
them,
without
which
a civilization 1982
would stand in danger of ossifica-9
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tion. "Sufficient elaboration" does not require equality of attention; a
firm presence, even if recessive, may be enough.
The theoretical reasons for this expectation are (1) the general logic of
the human mind which allows, although perhaps not with the same ease
in all languages, the opposite of everything that is affirmed in a civilizational design to be imagined as a possibility, either threatening or enchanting (although its opposite may of course be incorporated into the
affirmation itself); (2) the psychological anchoring of civilizational processes in a human nature which, however shaped into historically specific types, is presumed to suffer, in some measure, from the radical
exclusion of "anything human" (even though the visible signs of such
suffering may appear only cumulatively over several generations, the
"sins of the fathers" being, in this sense, visited upon the "children");
and (3) the historical tendency for structures of signification for which
there are no alternatives to cease to provoke creative efforts except
those of marginal ornamentation and conceptual clarification.
Civilizations can be comprehended structurally— as unique configurations of symbolic designs to be maintained and expressed in action.17
Dynamically a civilization may be viewed as a tighter or looser bundle
of a number of analytically identifiable processes which generate needs
(in the sense of deficiencies that cannot be met from within the type of
action which has resulted in them) for each other.
Though at a particular historical moment many of these needs may
remain unmet, a civilization, if it endures, has life enough and time to
wait, as we do not. (In this respect the perspective of the civilizationist
differs from that of the sociologist.) The balancing of these processes
may occur over time and at various levels of a civilizational configuration and its social contexts. Trends evident in one institutional sector or
in one social class may be compensated for by opposite trends in another institutional sector or class. The balancing tendencies may latch
on to the traditional cultural differences between—or political rivalries
among—major social formations within a civilization, such as nations,
regions, social strata, or religious and ideological groupings (or even
the durable differentiations within religious or ideological groupings,
such as " h i g h " vs. "popular", " l e f t " vs. " r i g h t " , "orthodox" vs.
"heterodox", "public" vs. "private" " m a l e " vs. " f e m a l e " ) .
In Islam, the bedouins and the city, the imperial bureaucracy and the
religious notables, the orthodoxy and Sufism, Arabs, Persians, Turks,
and Malayo-Indonesians; in the post-medieval West, the Mediterraneans and the Nordics, mystics and managers, France and Germany, aristocratic and bourgeois cultures (and the ideological emanations of the
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latter, conservatism, liberalism, romanticism, and socialism), the images of " A t h e n s " and "Jerusalem," of "Europe" and " A m e r i c a " ,
and the counter-image of "Russia" (heir of the earlier counter-image of
the " M o n g o l s " ) , Christianity and Marxism, each in several versions,
and the opiates of "Orientalism" and the "Third World" have at various times provided structural bases—though not quite invariant points
of reference—for the balancing tendencies to center on.
Can we in fact anticipate that, if one side of an axis of differentiation
is strongly elaborated in a civilizational design, the need for its counterpart correspondingly increases and, if this need is not eventually met by
internal generation or by creative borrowing, a "deformation" in the
construction of a civilization can be identified, a one-sidedness with
demonstrable pathological effects, a reduction of vitality in competing
with other civilizations? Can the civilization of India be said to have
been " d e f o r m e d " by the insufficiency, between Buddhism and the
bhakti movement, of equalizing tendencies within its sacred hierarchic
totality? Can a variety of Western pathologies be explained by an overdevelopment of the increasingly secular individualizing egalitarian design so ably explicated by Louis Dumont?'8
In both cases, the reference is not to the empirical presence of egalitarian or hierarchic social relations, but to the symbolic frameworks
legitimating hierarchic totality (composed, in India, of infinitely divisible components) or egalitarian individuality (composed, in the traditional West, of indivisible parts) as norms of what is properly expectable in human experience."1 The argument is not that society needs
hierarchic organization for the efficiency or decisiveness of administration and equality for cementing solidarities among its members. It is
rather that cultural tradition, to be adequate to what human beings need
of culture, requires a firm sense both of the hierarchy of values intrinsic
to it and of the equality of the claims of the orientational alternatives to
constitute challenges to the human imagination. (By this criterion, it is
possible for a cultural tradition to be deficient in both hierarchy and
equality simultaneously.)
It is generally recognized in sociological literature that strains between culture and social structure arise when egalitarian culture is confronted with the persistence of established hierarchies in the administration of human affairs. I am concerned here with the question whether a
culture of great complexity is not impoverished, in some recognizable
sense, if it is too emphatically either hierarchic or egalitarian in the
symbolizations it constructs—or onesided along any other axis of civilizational design.2"
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The problem of a balanced state of a civilization—a condition one
might consider most conducive to the realization of the plenitude of
human possibilities—can be approached only through a comparison of
historical cases, which may well prove to be too complex to be directly
compared or unambiguously interpreted. Moreover, approximations to
a balanced state of civilization seem capable of existing only as protracted efforts to overcome previous imbalances likely to terminate in
the establishment of new ones. They are therefore likely to be periods of
cultural conflict, violent and "uncomfortable"—yet exhilarating and
creative. While the historic civilizations would seem to possess, by virtue of their internal diversity, traditions of reflection, and crosscivilizational contacts, a superior capacity for self-revision and rebalancing of their symbolic designs, they may also be capable, due to their
great resources, of surviving longer in a badly unbalanced condition.
The efflorescence of T'ang China, when Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism coexisted on roughly the same level of intellectual sophistica' tion and social acceptance suggests that the multisidedness of a civilization, when the symbolic alternatives it contains are of approximately
equal strength and mutually permeable without losing their own distinctive character, is powerfully conducive to cultural vitality.2' But a plurality of apparently different traditions can still add up to an "unbalanced"
state of the whole, if they are all heavily influenced by one set of fundamental civilizational orientations, as is so frequently the case in presentday West, especially where traditions of Romantic derivation are weak
or where they have been neutralized—relegated either to the sphere of
private consumption or party propaganda, the latter in official Marx22

ism.
While onesidedness in civilizational designs is bound to be, at least in
the long run, devitalizing, a high degree of disconnection between the
elements of culture representing opposites on the axis of differentiation
schema, even when both sides are equally strong, can be disruptive, not
only of the basic design of a civilization, but also of the identities of
individuals carrying on their lives within it (cf. "reason" and "emotion" in Rousseau). The particular symbolic designs embodying alternative orientations can be connected to each other either through an
overarching imperial synthesis (the medieval Christian, Islamic, Communist), or by mutual permeability of the particular symbolic designs
within a historically continuous civilization (China, Japan), or through
the intricate patterns of a dance in which opposite principles succeed
each other over time in a series of "eternal" postures (India, Indonesia). Ideological alternatives may be partly integrated—in a way, how-
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ever, which tends to maximize violent competition for domination
among them—through their common origin and the sharing of essential
components derived from it. A clear division of spheres between alternative orientations, such as post-medieval Europe has increasingly attempted to establish in a variety of spheres, is better than chaos, but it
seems likely to prove excessively rigid, too artificially aseptic, hence
unsatisfactory to the demand for the unity of human experience, hence
unstable. (Traces of all modes of integration can be found in the West.)
There is the further problem of inter-axial equilibria, the establishment and disturbance of attunements among the different axes of civilizational design. It may be presumed that a pronounced development
along one civilizational axis causes a "deformation" in the total design
which sets up pressures upon the other axes, and that some sort of
compensatory or isolating or suppressive development is likely to take
place on the other axes of a civilizational design, though not necessarily
at once. Thus the Marxist thrust toward equality and connectedness had
the unintended effect, in the Soviet Union where one version of the
Marxist movement has come to power, of increasing rationalization at
the expense of emotionality, and control at the cost of liberation, along
the latter two axes of civilizational design. An investigation of such
inter-axial thrusts promises a fruitful approach to understanding the part
of specific social movements within long-term processes of civilizational change, once the analytical axes of civilizational design have
been more securely identified than has been possible so far.
One would assume fuzziness on the civilizational dilemmas—lack of
clarity of intellectual commitment to any particular position with regard
to them—especially among the intellectual elites (and their students), to
be problematic. The "narcissistic personality," of which a veritable
cult has recently been made, especially in the United States, can be best
described as an expression of onesided affirmations of liberating,
equalizing, empiricizing, and expanding (the "omnivorous egalitarian
consciousness")—and of widespread "pop-sophisticated" fuzziness on
the issues of internalizing vs. externalizing, rationalizing vs. emotionalizing, connecting vs. disconnecting, universalizing vs. particularizing, and archaizing vs. Juturizing."
Obsessive boring into the self or casual boredom with it, but in either
case without a credible way of understanding its character or establishing a mutually sustaining relationship to any external institutional structure sensed as appropriate to it. Instrumental and procedural rationalization without much conviction in the directive capacity of reason or any
way, outside of psychotherapy perhaps, of communicating between
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these rationalizations and one's emotions, if one can spontaneously,
without artificial aids, experience emotions (as contrasted to anxieties)
at all, let alone trustworthy ones. Temporary pseudo-intimacies, perpetual absences of a rooted standpoint. Breakdowns of standardization,
weightless particularisms. And a future consisting mainly of a misunderstood past—which may in fact be the past of the analyst, or of an
analytic machinery (conceivably even of civilization analysis), rather
than one's own living past. These are perhaps psychological, or psychocultural, predicaments, but they arise from or express fuzziness on some
of the major civilizational dilemmas for which other times—though not
all times—have managed, or mystified, to provide more "gripping solutions" (not necessarily fully understandable, but powerfully credible).
Fuzziness of experience, most strikingly evident among the fashionably educated of advanced industrial societies (and to some degree the
product of fashionable education), confronts, as psychological " r a w
material," the symbolic designs, established or emerging, intended to
give coherence and direction to human experiences. Fuzziness carries
the potentiality for rearrangements of traditional designs, a task best
performed in the last two centuries by Romanticism-inspired movements. It is the historical trajectories of the symbolic designs that civilization analysis is concerned with.
But the historical trajectory of a civilizational configuration is not a
history of ideas. In the first place, it has to do not with the ideas of
distinguishable individual thinkers, but with the structures of and
changes in the underlying collective matrices of consciousness within
which the ideas of individuals germinate (and which they interpret,
modify or offend against).
In the second place, civilization analysis is concerned not with the
symbolic designs alone, but with the predicaments in experience to
which symbolic designs respond and the predicaments in experience
which established symbolic designs, in concrete sociohistorical settings, generate.24 The problem is that of the historical dialectic of individual experiences and their collective comprehensions.
IV. Relations of Social Movements to Civilizational Processes
The following hypotheses appear to hold for social movements of
world-historical significance. First, such movements emerge in response to a rapid trend toward deauthorization of traditions that have
synthesized, or held together, the opposite poles of orientation along
most or all of the civilizational axes of differentiation within a tolerably
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coherent and intuitively credible pattern (which may have been seriously unbalanced yet satisfactory until challenged by external influences or proved inadequate by unanticipated events).25
Tendencies toward fragmentation of unifying patterns precede, either
on the level of "raw experience," or of conscious interpretive thought,
the emergence of major social movements. Bizarre, short-lived popular
movements, such as that of Sabbatai Zevi, constitute only one specific,
but highly characteristic, indicator of such fragmentation.26 Such movements tend to be sociologically incompetent efforts at resolving primarily the civilizational, and only secondarily, if at all, the practical problems arising from such fragmentation. Deauthorization is, in the normal
course of affairs, accompanied by a sharpening of tensions between
alternative orientations, by violent oscillations between them in popular
attitudes, and by increased confusion, indifference or fuzziness on basic
civilizational matters.27
Second, social movements of world-historical significance (as well as
many lesser movements) define such orientational tensions more
clearly, transforming much of prior confusion and inconclusiveness into
rigid alternatives, and intensify intracivilizational contradictions both in
social action and in the identities of individuals.
However, third, social movements of world-historical significance
more than other movements also promulgate effectively vitalizing partial resolutions of these tensions by bringing forth or popularizing intuitively credible symbolic designs that, for the time being, appear to incorporate, allow for, or reconcile a great many of these contradictions.
To be sure, it is not only the "charismatic" synthesizing of discordant
sociocultural trends into a coherent symbolic design, but also the ability
to offer pragmatic advantages (security, power, fame, wealth) to their
adherents, that explains the success of sociocultural movements.2*
Fourth, if such a movement is successful in attracting large numbers
of adherents for long periods of time and/or acquiring power in a society
or a significant section thereof, the group interests and the psychological needs of the later adherents of the movement contribute much to
deciding which side of each axis of differentiation will be further developed and socially institutionalized.
By neglecting the considerations put forth in the first three of these
hypotheses, the current sociological theory of movements cannot account for deeper levels of their symbolic constitution beyond programmatic declarations (and consequently finds much in these movements
inexplicably "irrational"). Nor can theory locate these movements in
relation to their cultural matrices or identify the processes by which
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their spiritual prerequisites have been assembled and their psychocultural influences diffused in a variety of directions.
Our primary concern here is with the major social movements which
have aimed at, and to some degree (though, in all likelihood, not wholly
in accordance with their original intentions) succeeded in, a reconstruction of the general quality of life of humanity, a nation, or a historically
significant ideological community. Among the major civilizationally
significant movements of the last two centuries may be listed the liberal,
the romantic (including in part the anarchist), the nationalist (with the
special case of the Zionist), the socialist, the psychological, and the
ecological, each in a variety of regional and period versions. Some of
the movements of revitalization of traditional religions, especially the
Islamic, can be added to this list. Each of the major civilizationally
significant movements needs to be considered, in a complete analysis,
together with its antecedents and pathbreakers as well as the movements
of reaction against it.
One might distinguish civilizationally significant movements from
special-interest movements that address themselves to a particular type
of practical concern (e.g., the labor movement, the gay rights movement). 29 Special-interest movements, which tend to represent longenduring interests, should in turn be distinguished from movements of
occasional responsiveness, originating in and expressing short-lived
emotional responses to particular situations (e.g., the Dreyfussard
movement, the movement of protest against American participation in
the Vietnamese war). These two types of movements may overlap.
Special-interest movements may start as movements of occasional responsiveness. But, in most movements of the latter type, such transformations do not happen. Both of these types of movements may influence the historical development of civilizations. But they lack the
overall thrust, the comprehensive programs, and the plurality of forms
within a single design characteristic of the major social movements.
Among movements that have civilizational implications, one might
consider as second-rate those movements which, whether successful or
not in achieving their stated goals, merely express the civilizational dilemmas, but do not advance their resolution in a fruitful manner.
Second-rate movements dredge up and temporarily activate a lot of civilizational "raw material," but they do not establish synthesizing designs capable of enduring for longer than a generation and of contributing to subsequent developments on both sides of a great many
civilizational axes of differentiation. What is identified, without further
qualification, as youth movements, tend to be second-rate." But so, I
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think, tend to be purely populist movements without a firmer ideology
than populism itself is capable of providing.31 Feminist movements, on
the other hand, appear to be non-reducible to their special-interest and
second-rate components.32
One might also distinguish, among social movements of worldhistorical significance, an impoverished type that puts an overwhelmingly strong stress on one side of a series of civilizational dilemmas at
the expense of the other and consequently, if it succeeds, impoverishes
the civilization of which it is a part. Such was the Bolshevik movement
in Russia, and, to a lesser degree, such might have been the Taiping
rebellion, if it had succeeded in its original design. The latter enriched
the Chinese tradition by inserting a profusion of distorted Christian elements into it, but diminished it by imposing a totalitarian mold on a
configuration of subtle diversity—though a full awareness of its subtlety
was presumably largely limited to sections of the educated gentry.33
I will consider the English Puritan movement in greater detail as the
type case of a modernizing social movement that was neither secondrate nor impoverished.34 All ten axes of differentiation constitute important foci for the Puritan—or, in a broader sense, the English
seventeenth-century revolutionary—movement.35 Along nine of these
ten axes, it is demonstrable that the Puritan movement, with all its accompaniments, has advanced civilizational developments on both sides
of each dilemma. Only on the issue of expanding vs. stabilizing has
Puritanism been onesidedly energy-activating: little can be credited to
its influence in any contemporary or subsequent energy refining and
receptivity enhancing. This is what has contributed greatly to the making of Romanticism and psychoanalysis so appealing to the distant heirs
of Puritanism: both Romanticism and psychoanalysis restore, in their
diverse ways, a balance between expanding and stabilizing, the energyactivating and the energy-refining orientations.
As for the rest: the Puritans stressed, more universally than the medieval Church had done, both the "asceticism" of the methodical control
of the self as well as of society and the "mystical" freedom, through
one's own "inner light", to one's own understanding of the workings of
the principle of salvation in one's life, and to being "born again" in
adulthood to a new spiritual consciousness. The Puritans emphasized
the inner capacity of each individual to be, in his conscience, his own
judge (internalizing) and they more strongly insisted on the responsibility to transform the secular society into a Utopia—the earthly kingdom
of God—by building impersonal, dispassionately operating institutions
(externalizing). They perceived nature, from which God had withdrawn
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and in which therefore the possibility of miracles no longer existed, as
more rational than before. But they also contributed to the emotionalization of modern culture, by unleashing religious enthusiasm from institutional controls, and by formulating, as Edmund Leites puts it, the duty
not only to love but also to desire one's spouse, thus advancing, under
moralistic auspices, the synthesis of marriage and the older tradition of
courtly love.
The Puritans saw individuals as more disconnected from each other in
their callings, in their separate concerns with the all-important personal
salvation and in the interminable search for the place in life in which
best to perform one's own mission of devoted work. But they also insisted more universally on the supreme religious obligation both to reveal one's "soul-experiments" publicly to other fellow-believers (connectedness through mutual revelation of inwardness)" and to establish
in the world impersonal voluntary associations of the faithful, devoting
all talent beyond one's own occupational pursuit and all one's surplus .
wealth to the service of these artificial communities (connectedness
through well-organized service.) The Puritans equalized men and
women in all social conditions in their moral obligations and in their
capacity to understand them, but they more rigidly hierarchized the
saints and the sinners, which medieval Christianity viewed as varying
only in degree. (From this hierarchy, it has been suggested, the recent
rigid separation of the sane from the insane has received much support
in Protestant-influenced traditions.)"
The Puritans reasserted the absolute transcendence of God against the
God-humanizing tendencies in late-medieval and Renaissance Catholicism, thus imparting to his commands a more rigid structure, less likely
to be softened by the human qualities of unsystematic, personal compassion. But, by their emphasis on individual reason and direct experience, they also advanced the empirical understanding of the world outside of the human self. (Since the human self contained, for the
Puritans, the soul or what they called the "spiritual self," and this was
the voice of God within man, the self—or rather the "spiritual" part of
it—could not become subject to the empiricizing understanding of everything that was not God; the " r a t " part of the self could be subjected,
later on, to experiments in psychology laboratories, which have produced a psychology that can only talk about that part of the self and has
consequently helped to generate a counter-tendency to feel that whatever is not " r a t " in the self must therefore be " G o d . " )
The fundamental structure of moral obligations and meanings is, for
the Puritans, more rigorously preordained, more unmanipulably sacred,
but all the social obligations have to be artificially established by acts of
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human conscience (through which God may or may not speak) and by
collective agreements. With regard to the merely traditional, insofar as
it is not specifically commanded by God, the Puritan is a secularizer, the
maker of respect-worthy—but not enjoyable—artificial structures. (He
has indeed been commanded by his God to be a serious artifice-maker,
and to impose these artifices on desacralized, and therefore either indifferent or evil, nature—to transform nature into a machinery, to leave no
human reality unconstructed by himself. The left wing of the Puritan
movement was, as Christopher Hill suggests, more favorable toward
nature, in accordance with the presumed tendency of both the European
working class and the aristocracy to oppose themselves as the upholders
o f "nature" against the "artificialism" shared by the bourgeoisie with
mainstream Puritanism.)18 The same standards hold for all, yet the
movement divides into an immense diversity of particularizing sects.
Finally, an archaizing re-emphasis on the Old Testament and, in some
cases, on "primitive communism" coexists with futuristic projects of
building the City upon the Hill.
V. Questions and Comments
Is this simultaneous pointing in a variety of opposite directions characteristic of all major movements that could be designated as "moderni z i n g " ? Or is this a characteristic only of movements that arise and
acquire a central role in the transitions, in Sorokin's terms, from one
fundamental culture mentality—that is, from one conception of ultimate
reality—to another?3' Are all social movements of world historical significance as rich in alternative directions embodied in their symbolic
designs as the Puritan movement has been?
If one takes all the varieties of nineteenth- and twentieth century Socialism, including the Utopians and the Edel-Marxisten

such as Adorno,

as components of another such movement, one might find a wealth in
alternative possibilities to rival—but not quite—that of the English
seventeenth-century revolutionaries. There appears, however, to be a
greater gap between the theories of the intellectual formulators and the
beliefs of the masses in the Socialist movement, at least in the European
world, than among the Puritans.40 It seems to be a response to the kind
of civilization-balancing need I have presumed that intentionally egalitarian movements end up with theories that are neither comprehensible
nor interesting to ordinary people. The ironies of the history of
culture—though possibly more ironic in Europe than elsewhere—are securely anchored in the structural connections of civilizational design.
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( N e w York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958);

George Simmel, The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays (New York:
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of the community, as frequently in the West, or with a cultural devaluation of
concrete social relations, as in the world-denying traditions of India. The opposite process of emotionalization advancing rationality also occurs. " T h e upshot
of all this unlimited emotionalism [of the Hasidic movement] was paradoxically
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Scholem, Major

Trends in Jewish Mysticism,

Rev. Ed. (New York: Schocken
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the period, and that the hippie movement may have done the same for the "postmodern" professionalized occupations. In both cases, emotionally oriented minority movements may have enabled the majority of economic rationalizers to
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Peacock, "Mystics and Merchants in Fourteenth Century Germany: A Speculative Reconstruction of Their Psychological Bond and Its Implications for Social Change," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,

8 (Spring, 1969), pp.
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Press, 1978), pp. 111-151; D. C. Phillips, Holistic

University

Thought in Social

Science

(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976); and, on the most generalized level, Jean Gebser, Ursprung

and Gegenwart,

2nd Ed. (Stuttgart:

Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966). (5) On hierarchizing vs. equalizing, Donald
J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1969); Sanford A . Lakoff, Equality in Political

Philosophy

(Cambridge,
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